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Abstract:
During the last decades, several countries have entrenched a special subcategory of law, which is
adopted by stricter procedural rules, than the requirements of the ordinary legislative process. These
laws are enacted by qualified majority, by the consent of the two chambers of the legislation, they
are subject to mandatory constitutional review before their promulgation, or additional safeguards
are implemented in the ordinary legislative process. Organic law appears in the French,  the Spanish
 and the Hungarian  legal system also as main models. Later, further European countries
implemented organic law in their legal system, such as Portugal,  Romania  or Moldova.  Organic law
is also known in Latin-America.
In Africa, a total of 19 countries have implemented organic law: Algeria;  Angola;  Benin;  Burkina
Faso;  Central African Republic;  Chad;  Djibouti;  Equatorial Guinea;  Gabon;  Guinea;  Ivory Coast;
Democratic Republic of Congo;  Republic of Congo;  Madagascar;  Mauritania;  Morocco;  Niger;
Senegal;  Togo;  Tunisia;  and Cape Werde Islands.
Although the fact, that organic law has been introduced in a huge number of African countries, this
phenomena has not been researched in depth int he relevant African literature. Several questions
might be raised: whether the implementation of organic law is a mere copy of European (French and
Portugal) samples, or internal African reasons may be also identifiable? What is the role of organic
law in African constitutional systems, could organic laws promote the stability of African
constitutional frameworks? Is there any regional differences between organic laws? African organic
laws differs remarkably from their European counterparts? Is there any African discussion or
jurisprudence from the legal category of organic law?
My study will address such issues, and would provide a broad overview from African organic laws. I
have three main purposes: to understand the characteristics of African organic laws; to compare the
relevant African and the European models; and to analyse the perspectives of organic laws in Africa.
My concept would be based on a combined strands of first and secondary African and European
sources, which have been rarely used in this integrated manner.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the last decades, several countries have entrenched a special subcategory of 
law, which is adopted by stricter procedural rules, than the requirements of the 
ordinary legislative process. These laws are enacted by qualified majority, by the 
consent of the two chambers of the legislation, they are subject to mandatory 
constitutional review before their promulgation, or additional safeguards are 
implemented in the ordinary legislative process. In this study, I compare the 
experiences of six European and twenty-one African legal systems, which provide 
several different frameworks of qualified law. My aim is to identify the most contested 
issues from the legal nature of qualified laws, and to outline, what are the 
characteristics of this legal concept in Europe, and in Africa. Although the fact, that 
organic law has been introduced in a huge number of African countries, this 
phenomenon has not been researched in depth in the relevant African literature. 
Several questions might be raised: whether the implementation of organic law is a 
mere copy of European (French and Portugal) samples, or the internal African 
background may be also influentious? What is the role of organic law in African 
constitutional systems, could organic laws promote the stability of African 
constitutional frameworks? Is there any regional differences between organic laws? 
African organic laws differs remarkably from their European counterparts? Is there any 
African discussion or jurisprudence from the legal category of organic law? 
My study will address such issues, and would provide a broad overview from African 
organic laws. I have three main purposes: to understand the characteristics of African 
organic laws; to compare the relevant African and the European models; and to 
analyse the perspectives of organic laws in Africa. My concept would be based on a 
combined strands of first and secondary African and European sources, which have 
been rarely used in this integrated manner. I have three main statements, which are 
intended to be proved in this study. Firstly, African organic laws are mostly inspired by 
European samples, however, the African organic laws are deemed to be independent 
legal concepts, not mere copy of European (French) constitutional provisions.1 
Although the fact, that the European approach of organic law is based on a proper 
balance between the institutional and the human rights approach, in Africa the 
fundamental right aspect has been almost completely neglected, organic laws cover 
generally the basic institutional framework of the state. Thirdly, African (and European) 
organic laws could rarely promote the endurance of the constitutional framework, 
consequently, the justification of their existence is not convincing. I will use the terms 
of “qualified law” and “organic law” in this study as synonyms. 
 
                                                 
1  FOMBAD Charles M. (ed.) [2017]: Separation of Powers in African Constitutionalism. Stellenbosch Handbook in 
African Constitutional Law. (Oxford University Press: Oxford) p. 50-65. 
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II. THEORETIC BACKGROUND: THE DEFINITION AND SPREAD OF 
ORGANIC LAW 
As a preliminary consideration, I will identify what I understand under the term 
qualified law. Different countries have constituted diverse concepts of qualified law, 
but we could outline the general content of this notion on the basis of national 
constitutions. Qualified law is a special category of statutes with clear constitutional 
background, which covers certain domain of crucial subject matters, and which is 
adopted with stricter procedural rules, than the ordinary legislative process.2 
Several expressions are used for the identification of qualified laws in the national 
legal instruments. These denominations shows the key functions of qualified laws, 
which are not only constitutional, but also political, historical, and have a clear 
sovereignty aspect also. Organic law appears in the French,3 and the Spanish4 
Constitution, this terminology focuses on the constitutional role of these texts. In 
Spain, these laws are part of the constitutional concept (constitutional bloc), and in 
most of the countries concerned, they are invoked during the constitutional review of 
ordinary laws.5 In some countries, organic laws are referred as institutional acts.6 The 
name of statutes with constitutional force was in force in Hungary after the fall of the 
communist regime, and it was considered that qualified laws has the same legal value 
as constitutional provisions. The expression of „law adopted by two-third majority” was 
the common language of the Hungarian public discussion between 1990 and 2011. 
This approach referred to the political aspect of this concept: a wide consent was 
required from the deputies to enact a qualified law, the simple majority was not 
sufficient. The new Fundamental Law of Hungary have modified the terminology, and 
constituted the category of cardinal laws,7, with mostly similar content, as its 
predecessor, the ”laws adopted by two-third majority”. This symbolic step aimed to 
strengthen the historical rhetoric of the Fundamental Law.8 
France, Spain and Hungary represents three main European models of qualified law. 
However, the issue of qualified law concerns not only the three abovementioned 
countries, but a huge number of jurisdictions around the word, and most organic laws 
are adopted outside from Europe. The modern history of qualified laws dated back to 
1958, with the Constitution of the Fifth Republic of France.9 After the decolonization of 
Africa, from the inspiration of the French model, numerous African countries from the 
                                                 
2   CAMBY Jean-Pierre [1998]: Quarante ans de lois organiques (Fourty years of organic laws) Revue de droit 
publique. 5-6. ed. p.: 1686-1698.; JAKAB András – SZILAGYI Emese [2014]: Sarkalatos törvények a magyar 
jogrendszerben. (Cardinal laws in the Hungarian Legal System.) Új Magyar Közigazgatás, 7/2014., 3. ed., p. 
96-110; AVRIL Pierre – GICQUEL Jean [2014]: Droit parlamentaire (Parliamentary law). (Dalloz: Paris) p. 267-307. 
3   art. 46. of the Constitution of France [04.10.1958] 
4   art. 81-1 of the Constitution of Spain [07.01.1978] 
5  N° 66-28, DC du 8 juillet 1966 (Rec., p. 15)., CHAGNOLLAUD Dominique Michel (ed.),[2012]: Traite international de 
droit constitutionnel (International treaty of constitutional law), vol. 1. (Dalloz : Paris) p. 340. 
6    The Constitution of Comoros [23.12.2001] 
7    art. T. of the Fundamental Law of Hungary [25.04.2011] 
8  KÜPPER Herbert [2014]: A kétharmados/sarkalatos törvények jelensége a magyar jogrendszerben. (The 
phenomena of cardinal laws in the hungarian legal system) MTA Law Working Papers 2014/46. p. 2-5. 
9     art. 46. of the the Constitution of France [04.10.1958.] 
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francophone legal family,10 accepted this legal solution, currently, the Constitution of 
twenty-one African countries contains the category of organic law such as Algeria,11 
Senegal,12 or Tunisia.13 The second wave of the spread of qualified law started after 
the fall of the authoritarian regime in Spain and Portugal:14 qualified law was 
implemented in both constitutions, and later, from that legal family, several Latin-
American countries followed this sample, like Ecuador,15 or Venezuela.16 Finally, as 
the third stage of spread of qualified law, this framework was added to the Hungarian, 
Romanian,17 and Moldovan18 constitutional system after the democratic transition. 
Moreover, some former member states of the Soviet Union have also codified a 
concept of qualified law, but these initiatives have been repealed. 
From this brief analysis, it is perceptible, that apart from the European and the African 
branch of organic law, this legal category exist also in Latin-America: apart from 
Ecuador and Venezuela, certain further countries have also implemented organic 
law,19 however the detailed assessment of this phenomena falls outside from the 
scope of the present study. 
In Africa, a total of twenty-one countries have implemented organic law: most of them 
were inspired by European constitutional systems (mostly by France, but Portugal is 
also relevant). Similarly to the world-wide spread of qualified law, a categorization of 
African organic laws may be also conceptualized on historical and geographical basis. 
One may identify five larger group of African states, where organic laws has been 
applied. Firstly, certain countries of the Maghreb region followed the French 
constitutional development even after the decolonization, Algeria;20 Mauritania;21 
Morocco;22 and Tunisia;23 have entrenched  
the category of organic law at the end of the 1950-s. The second subgroup is 
constituted by most of the former West-African French colonies: Benin;24 Burkina 
Faso;25 Guinea;26 Ivory Coast;27 Niger;28 Senegal;29 and Togo.30 Nevertheless, not all 
                                                 
10   DAVID René [1964]: Les grands systemes de droit contemporains (The major contemporary systems of law) 
(Dalloz: Paris) p. 630. 
11    art. 123. of the Constitution of Algeria [28.11.1996] 
12    art. 78. of the Constitution of Senegal [07.01.2001] 
13    art. 65. of the Constitution of Tunisia [26.01.2014] 
14    art. 169. (2) of the Constitution of Portugal (02.04.1976] 
15    art. 133 of the Constitution of Ecuador  [20.10.2008] 
16    art. 203. of the Constitution of Venezuela [31.12.1999] 
17    art. 73. of the Constitution of Romania [08.12.1991] 
18    art. 72. (3) of the Constitution of  Moldova [29.07.1994] 
19  art. 63. of the Constitution of Chile [21.10.1980], art. 112. of the Constitution of the Dominican Republic 
[13.06.2015], art. 151. of the Constitution of Colombia [04.07.1991], art. 164. of the Constitution of Panama 
[1972], art. 106. of the Constitution of Peru [31.12.1993],  
20    art. 123. of the Constitution of Algeria [15.05.1996] 
21    art. 67. of the Constitution of Mauritania [12.07.1991] 
22    art. 85. and 86. of the Constitution of Morocco [01.07.2011] 
23    art. 65. of the Constitution of Tunisia [26.01.2014] 
24    art. 97. of the Constitution of Benin [02.12.1990] 
25    art. 155. of the Constitution of Burkina Faso [02.06.1991] 
26    art. 83. of the Constitution of Guinea [07.05.2010] 
27    art. 71. of the Constitution of Ivory Coast [08.11.2016] 
28    art. 131. and 184. of the Constitution of Niger [10.31.2010] 
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French post-colonies introduced organic laws, for instance, the Constitution of Mali 
does not operate with this legal instrument. Thirdly, some further Francophone 
countries shall be mentioned from East-Africa, and from the African-related islands of 
the Indian-Ocean: the Comoros;31 Djibouti;32 and Madagascar.33 The fourth region is 
Central-Africa, where some relevant countries belonged either to Belgium or France 
during the colonial era: Burundi,34 Central African Republic;35 Chad;36 Equatorial 
Guinea;37 Gabon;38 Democratic Republic of Congo;39 Republic of Congo;40 and 
Rwanda.41 Lastly, after the fall of the Salazar regime in Portugal, organic laws were 
implemented not only in Portugal, but also in Angola;42 and Cape Verde Islands.43 
The foregoing considerations give us some sense of the main constitutional issues, 
raised by the concept of qualified law in Europe and Africa. Each country have applied 
this solution to promote a clear constitutional aim, therefore, in the first chapter, I will 
compare the historical background of the European and the African emerges. The 
scope of qualified law differs significantly from country to country, consequently, in the 
second chapter, I will outline the scope of ordinary and qualified law in the different 
countries, and I will argue for a narrower scope of qualified law. Furthermore, qualified 
law may have a special position in the hierarchy of norms, somewhere between 
statutory and the constitutional level, so chapter three will cover this issue.44 I will 
concentrate especially on the level of precision of constitutional articles in this regard.  
It is also worth-contemplating, that the qualified subject matters are divided into two 
main categories: the fundamental rights, and the basic institutional framework of the 
state.45 By general terms, the institutional function of organic law is the primary 
consideration, especially in Africa, therefore qualified law is used mostly as an indirect 
instrument for the protection of fundamental rights. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
29    art. 78. of the Constitution of Senegal [07.01.2001] 
30    art. 92. of the Constitution of Togo [14.10.1992] 
31    art. 26. of the Constitution of the Comoros [23.12.2001] 
32    art. 66. of the Constitution of Djibouti [1992] 
33    art. 88. and 89. of the Constitution of Madagascar [14.10.2010] 
34    art. 175. of the Constitution of Burundi [28.02.2005] 
35    art. 70., and 73 of the Constitution of Central African Republic [27.12.2004] 
36    art. 127. of the Constitution of Chad [1996] 
37    art. 104. of the Constitution of Equatorial Guinea [1991, amended in 2011] 
38    art. 60. of the Constitution of Gabon  [1991, last amended in 2011] 
39    art. 124. of the Constitution of Democratic Republic of Congo [18.02.2006] 
40    art. 125. of the Constitution of the Republic of Congo [2001, last amended: 25.10.2015] 
41    art. 73. (1) of the Constitution of Rwanda [30.05.1991] 
42    art. 166. (2) b) and art. 169. (2) of the Constitution of Angola [21.01.2010] 
43    art. 173. (3) and 187. (2) b) of the Constitution of Cape Verde Islands [1980] 
44 TROPER Michel – CHAGNOLLAUD Dominique (szerk.) [2012]: Traite international de droit  constitutionnel 
(International Treaty of Constitutional Law (Dalloz: Paris) p. 346. 
45   14/B/2002. ruling of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, ABH 2003, p. 1476; 4/1993. (II.12.) ruling of the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court, ABH 1993, p. 48. 
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III. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Although the fact, that certain elements of the British constitutional development are 
close to the logic of qualified law,46and similar concepts have been also elaborated in 
the continental Europe,47 modern organic laws were introduced firstly in France, by De 
Gaulle, who highlighted the institutional aspect, and almost neglected the role of 
organic laws, as an instrument for right protection.48 Owing to this approach, the 
French organic laws covers mostly the basic institutional framework of the state.49 As 
this will be demonstrated later, this approach is highly influentious in Africa. Firstly, 
since France had consistently a number of qualified norms even at the constitutional 
level,50 not surprisingly, this country was the first which incorporated the concept of 
qualified law in its constitutional system in 1958. Organic law had been expected to be 
a proper instrument to promote the aims of the framers to weaken the Parliament and 
to rebalance separation of powers. De Gaulle had at least four considerations for 
playing down the legislature. Firstly, the Fourth Republic was suffered from a very 
serious degree of instability: governments were not able to survive even a year.51 It 
was generally considered, that the over weakness of the government was the main 
reason of this discrepancy, consequently, the legislative branch had too broad margin 
of movement. De Gaulle and his colleagues intended to reduce the decisive role of the 
Parliament, accordingly, the distribution of public power was reconsidered in favour of 
the executive: Parliament would not have unlimited power to determine the 
organisation of state, the executive branch would have wider competences in these 
fields.52 
 
Secondly, the significant laws were modified too frequently during the Fourth Republic, 
in light of the preferences of the actual parliamentarian majority. We have to take into 
consideration that the composition of the legislation changed rapidly, and there were 
not any safeguard on the stability of norms. Owing to the “rationalisation of the 
parliamentarism”,53 certain subject matters would be protected from the unlimited 
power of the Parliament, the basic rules of the organisation of state would be not 
subject to actual political considerations. 
 
Thirdly, the original constitutional framework of the Fifth Republic focused on 
institutional issues, the constitutional text do not contain any catalogue of fundamental 
                                                 
46  LEYLAND Peter [2012]: The constitution of the United Kingdom: a contextual analysis (Oxford; Portland, Or., Hart 
Publishing), p. 25-42. 
47   POURHIET Anne-Marie le [2007]: Droit constitutionnel (Constitutional law) (Economica: Paris) p. 233-243.; 
HAURIOU Maurice [1918]: „Principes du droit public” An interpretation of principles of Public Law), Harvard Law 
Review 1918/31. 813-821. 
48   BLACHER Philippe [2012]: Le Parlement en France. [The Parliament in France]. Etude (broché). Paru en 
08/2012. p. 11-23.   
49  TROPER Michel [2008]: „Constitutional Law” in BERMAN George – PICARD Etienne (szerk.): Introduction to French 
Law (Wolters Kluwer) p. 13.  
50   CAMBY Jean-Pierre [1998]: Quarante ans de lois organiques. (Fourty years of organic laws). Revue de droit 
publique. 1998. 5-6. ed. p. 1686-1698.  
51  DEBRE Michel [1959]: La nouvelle Constitution (The new constitution). In: Revue française de science politique, 
9e année, n°1, 1959. p. 7. 
52    BLACHER 2012. 
53 ARDANT Philippe – MATHIEU Bertrand [2014]: Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques. (Constitutional law and 
political institutions) 26e Édition. p. 344-345. 
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rights.54 This is the main reason, that the French model of qualified law is applied only 
in the field of the organisation of state fundamental rights are not covered by this 
concept. The founders of the Fifth Republic wanted to create a safeguard only for the 
basic institutions of the state, but the framers were not interested in other possible 
fields of introduction, such as fundamental rights. 
 
Fourthly, as an implicit aspect, the fear from the dictatorship shall be mentioned, which 
was experienced during the Second World War, by the Vichy regime. Organic laws 
were able not only to protect the democracy from instability, but also exclude the 
future chances of an authoritarian regime. 
On the contrary, in Spain, certain balance is applied between the fundamental right 
and the institutional approach.55 Contrary to France, in Spain, a broad circle of 
fundamental rights are regulated by organic laws.56 The Spanish Constitutional Court 
have elaborated consequently a restrictive interpretation of the organic legislative 
domain to avoid the unnecessary limitation on the governmental margin of 
movement.57 Despite the Spanish approach, Portugal has introduced a more 
institutionalized approach, which falls closer to the French interpretation, than to the 
Spanish.58 
Organic laws were added to the Spanish constitutional system by the Constitution of 
1978, after the fall of the Franco regime, as part of the democratic transition of the 
country. Despite the clear French influence, the historical background of the 
constitution-drafting process was completely different, than in France. Spain had lack 
of democratic traditions, the two previous Spanish republics had very short life, these 
regimes failed to gain stability, and to create efficient mechanisms to prevent 
authoritarian aspirations.59 
Moreover, a remarkable degree of uncertainty surrounded the transition: initially, it 
was very questionable, whether the new king was engaged to democratic processes, 
or try to maintain some sort of dictatorship. Regarding these circumstances, the 
drafters sought for such solutions, which were able to promote the self-defence of the 
democratic system. Indeed, the primary purpose of the framers was the emerge of 
democratic safeguards, and organic law was one of them. Due to the numerous 
parties,60 and ethnicities,61 the Spanish political life was very fragmented, thus, wide 
consent was essential to outline the new structure and to maintain the integrity of the 
country.62 Despite the clear French influence,63 the requirements of a democratic 
                                                 
54    TROPER 2008, p. 13.  
55    SJCC 76/1983, of 5 August, LC 2; 160/1987, of 27 October LC 2. 
56    JCC no. 236/2007. 
57   BARCELÓ I SERRAMALERA Merce [2004]: La ley Organica ámbito material y posición en el systema de fuentes 
[Organic laws, and their status within the hierarchy of norms]. Atelier Libros Juridicos, Barcelona, p. 30-31. 
58    Constitutional Law, in AAVV. Portuguese Law – An Overview. Lisboa: Almedina, 2007, p. 75-89. 
59  COMELLA Victor Ferreres [2013]: „The Framing of the Spanish Constitution” in COMELLA Victor Ferreres: The 
Constitution of Spain: A Contextual Analysis (Bloomsbury Publishing PLC: Oxford) 4-34.  
60    BONIME – BLANC Andrea [2013]: Constitution Making and Democratization, p. 200. 
61    CONVERSI Daniele [2002]: „The Smooth Transition” National Identities 2002/3. 223-244. 
62    CONVERSI 2002, p. 230. 
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transition, the huge fear from authoritarian tendencies, the protection of integrity, and 
the demands of autonomous regions explain, that the scope of Spanish organic law is 
significantly broader, than its French counterpart. 
The huge fear from the unlimited governmental power during the democratic transition 
explains why organic laws were introduced in certain Central-European countries.64 A 
political transition may often lead to extended violence, or even armed conflicts, 
therefore, a further target was to exclude violent incidents, or at least take immediate 
control over agressive tendencies.65 In Romania, the drafters of the Constitution could 
not rely mostly on national traditions one may could refer only to a document from the 
middle of the XIX. century which was called „organic law of Romania”. However, this 
organic law had a constitutional status, rather than a special form of legislation.66 
Nevertheless, the French, and in certain respects the German, the Italian and the 
Belgian constitutional systems were also influentious during the drafting of the 
Romanian democratic framework.67 Apart from this, from the 1980s, the Romanian 
society had several direct and painful experience from the overbroad power of the 
dictatorship, from the sistematic and serious breaches of fundamental rights. In 
Romania, instead of peaceful means, the transition was achieved by a revolution. This 
situation required serious carefulness from the drafters of the new Constitution: 
several legal instruments were considered, which could promote the stability of the 
constitutional system. Romania is the only European country, where qualified laws 
were implemented to the Constitution shortly after an armed conflict.  
In Moldova, local constitutional traditions were apparently irrelevant an independent 
Moldovan State just existed during the last period of world war I, but, only for some 
months.68 As a consequence, the foreign samples were highlighted: in the reality, the 
structure and the logic of the Romanian Constitution dominated the Moldovan 
constitution-making process.69 It is also worth-contemplating, that the Moldovan 
society were divided by a great number of conflicts during the process of the 
democratic transition: the tensions between the Romanian and the Russian 
population, the claim for independence from the Transnistrian Territory, as well as the 
autonomous status of Gagauzia were also controversial issues. In the light of these 
concerns, it may have been justifiable to require a heightened level of parliamentary 
majority for the adoption of organic laws. The representatives of this theory state, that 
                                                                                                                                                          
63    TROPER 2012, p. 344. 
64  BOZÓKI András (ed.) [1999]: The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy Central 
European University Press, p. 2478.  
65   ELSTER John [2012]: Constitution-making and violence. Journal of Legal Analysis 4:7–39, p. 7-9. and 21-37. 
66  On the basis of the interview with Prof. Simina Elena Tanasescu, and Prof. Stefan Deaconu, lecturers of the 
Constitutional Law Department at the University of Bucharest. [Bucharest, 23.01.2017] 
67  DELEANU Ioan [2006]: Institutii si proceduri constitutionale. [Constitutional procedures and institutions]. Ed. CH 
Beck, Bucuresti, p. 220. 
68   LENGYEL László [2011]: A Moldáv Köztársaság. [The Republic of Moldova]. Magyar Moldáv Baráti Társaság, 
Budapest, p. 55. 
69     CARNAT Teodor [2005]: Constitutional law. Chisinau, State University of Chisinau, p. 129-130.  
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Moldovan organic Law were introduced due to the strong Romanian and Russian 
impact and several legal arguments were also raised.70 
The Hungarian case is more complex in this regard it originates from the era of the 
historical constitutional development.71 before 1945, the so-called cardinal laws meant 
the cornerstones of the Hungarian constitutional framework.72 Nevertheless, the circle 
of cardinal laws was not outlined preciselly, and these laws were subject to the same 
legislative procedure, as ordinary acts.73 In 1989, the six laws, which determined the 
character of the democratic transition were also often summarized as „cardinal 
laws”.74 Almost simultaneously with this development, the category of laws with 
constitutional force was established to suplement the democratic constitution: similarly 
to the constitution, for the adoption, or amendment of these laws, the two-third 
consent of all parliamentary members was required.75 According to the contemporary 
approach, all legal rules, which concerned fundamental rigghts, shall have been 
covered by laws with constitutional force. The overbroad application of qualified 
majority requirement undermined the governance of the country, since almost all 
legislative fields concern - at least indirectly – fundamental rights.76 The qualified 
majority requirement was stricter in 1989, than nowadays, and a wider circle of laws 
fall within its scope, than currently, under the Fundamental Law of Hungary. The 
concept of laws with constitutional force were created to decrease uncertainity: the 
participants of the political arena could not foresee the outcome of the forthcoming 
parliamentary elections, and the intentions of the future winners. As a consequence, 
almost every political actors had strong interest to establish an inclusive legislative 
process.77 After having recognized the distortive effect of the overbroad qualified 
majority requirement, and after the first democratic elections, during the spring of 
1990, the new government and the opposition concluded a compromise to reduce the 
domain of qualified law. The „laws with constitutional force” were replaced by the 
terminology of „laws adopted with two-thirds majority”, and the qualified legislative 
subject matters were more or less exhaustively enumerated by the Constitution.78 
Instead of the „large qualified majority”, only the two-thirds consent of such deputies 
was prescribed, who participated in the particular vote. This solution was close to the 
Spanish logic, which is based on a proper balance between the right protection and 
                                                 
70   On the basis of the interview made with Prof. Violeta Cojocaru, the leader of the Constitutional Law Department 
of the University of Chisinau.  [Chisinau, 14.09.2017] 
71   MARCZALI Henrik [1907]: Az 1790/1-diki országgyűlés. [The Hungarian Parliament in 1790, and act I. of 1790]. 
Budapest. A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Kiadása. I. k., p. 110.  
72  HAJNÓCZY József [1791]: Magyarország Országgyűléséről. [From the parliament of Hungary] in HAJNÓCZY József 
közjogi-politikai munkái. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1958, p. 236-240. 
73   DR. FERDINÁNDY Géza [1902]: Magyarország közjoga. [The public law of Hungary]. (Alkotmányjog) Budapest. 
Politzer Zsigmond és Fia kiadása, p. 77. 
74   ANTAL Attila – BRAUN István – FINTA László – TÖRÖK Zoltán [2011]: Sarkalatos kérdések. [Cardinal issues]. 
Méltányosság Politikaelemző Központ 2011. november 24, p. 5. 
       www.meltanyossag.hu/files/meltany/imce/doc/kp_sarkalatos_kerdesek_111122.pdf 
75    art. 8. of Act XXXI. of 1989. 
76    ANTAL 2011, p. 20. 
77   SZALAI András [2011]: A kormányzati hatalom ellensúlyai Magyarországon. [The counterbalances of the 
government in Hungary]. 
       www.propublicobono.hu/pdf/Szalai_2.pdf 
78    act XL. of 1990. 
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the institutional approach.79 The Fundamental Law of Hungary entered into effect in 1 
January 2012, which highlights the historical traditions by reinstating the term of 
„cardinal law”, but the current content of this expression is not equivalent to the 
historical meaning.80 Currently, the cardinal subject matters are enumerated 
exhaustively by the Fundamental Law, the required majority is always the two-thirds 
consent of the parlamentarians present. The cardinal acts, or legislative subject 
matters are provided expressly by the Fundamental Law,81 but the fundamental rights 
have been almost disappeared from the list of cardinal fields under the new 
constitutional framework.82 The current Hungarian interpretation is close to the French, 
as well as the Romanian/Moldovan approach, since the institutional side is dominant, 
and only a little number of fundamental rights and a narrow circle of indirect 
safeguards for right protection are regulated by cardinal laws.83  
Hungary is a special model of European qualified legislation, because during less than 
30 years, at least three different models of qualified law have been introduced. While 
in other countries, the established version of qualified law – with its advantages and 
weaknesses – determines the constitutional development during long decades, 
Hungary has experienced the regular reconsideration of the qualified law concept.84 
The African historical experience is not only the mere copy of the European samples 
in this regard, but also the consideration of the local circunstances, which may have 
also justified the implementation of qualified law. The freshly-formed African countries 
could not rely on long-term cohesion, diverse ethnic groups were forced to live 
together due to the artificial borders created by the European colonisers.85 The 
Maghreb region shall be distinguished here from other African jurisdictions, as an 
exception, since those states constituted more or less an unitary development for the 
ancient period. However, most African states expected to be threatened by the 
internal conflicts, therefore, all instruments were considered, which could promote the 
stability of these countries. Organic law provided political weight for a broader circle of 
political actors, than the ordinary legislative process, so the consensual legislation 
were supposed to strenghten the cohesion of the post-colonial countries. A further 
consideration is the post-traumatic effect of organic law. In the relevant European 
countries, organic laws were always introduced after a democratic transition to avoid 
                                                 
79  CHOFRE SIRVENT J. F. [1994]: Significado y función de las leyes orgánicas. [The functions and significance of 
organic laws]. 1994, Madrid: Tecnos, p. 19-50 and 59-61. 
80  BARNA Dániel – SZENTGÁLI-TÓTH Boldizsár [2013]: Stabilitás vagy Parlamentarizmus? A sarkalatos törvényekkel 
kapcsolatos egyes jogalkotási problémák. [Stability or parliamentarism? Certain constitutional issues 
concerning cardinal laws]. Ars Boni Law Review, 14.02.2013. 
       www.arsboni.hu/barnaszentg.html 
81   BODNÁR Eszter – MÓDOS Mátyás [2012]: A jogalkotás normatív kereteinek változásai az új jogalkotási törvény 
elfogadása óta.  [The normative framework of law-making under the new act on legislation]. 2012/ 1, p. 33-34. 
82   SZENTGÁLI-TÓTH Boldizsár [2012]: Alapjogok új alapokon? (társszerzőkkel) [Fundamental rights on new basis?] 
With co-authors. in Változások a magyar alkotmányjogban. Tanulmányok az Alaptörvényről. [The Hungarian 
constitutional reform: studies from the Fundamental Law of Hungary]. (Ed..: BALOGH Elemér et al.), Hallgatói 
Közjogi Dolgozatok 1., FÁMA Zrt. - Nemzeti Közszolgálati és Tankönyv Kiadó, p. 53-79. 
83     JAKAB 2014; see footnote 3. 
84  KUKORELLI István [2006]: Tradíció és modernizáció a magyar alkotmányjogban. [Tradition and modernization in 
the Hungarian constitutional law]. Századvég Kiadó, Budapest, p. 155. 
85     FOMBAD 2017, p. 50-65. 
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the restoration of the authoritarian tendencies. This may have been also a relevant 
consideration for African constitution-drafters, especially in those countries, where 
organic laws were established after an armed conflict. Obviously, the long-term 
constitutional development of France or even Portugal provided also a proper point of 
reference, which could be also an emphatic argument in Africa. Apart from this, the 
long-term development of African organic laws shall be distinguished from most of the 
relevant European systems. Except from Hungary, in Europe, the basic concept of 
organic law has been elaborated for long-term, since from its introduction, it has not 
been amended in essence. By contrast, in several African countries, new consecutive 
constitutions were adopted, either as the outcome of violent or peaceful transitions,86 
therefore, the framework of organic law has been amended regularly. As recent 
examples, the constitution-drafting wave after the arab spring may be mentioned,  or 
in Ivory Coast, the two-thirds majority system87 were replaced by an absolute majority 
requirement in 2016, two-thirds consent remained only as a complementary element 
of the concept88. The North-African and the Ivorian experience demonstrate also, that 
the development of African organic law is an on-going process further improvements 
may be expected in the near future. In Europe, only the Hunggarian constitutional 
design has been amended such frequently, as the relevant African models. 
Consequently, it is at least doubtful, whether African organic law could fulfil their 
inherent function to promote the stability of post-colonial African constitutional 
frameworks. Finally, organic laws in Africa are generally considered strictly as the 
instruments to institutionalize the state, to secure wide consent behind the 
constitutional configuration.89 Owing to this approach, African organic laws protect 
only fundamental rights in the Maghreb region, especially in Morocco90 and Tunisia.91 
 
IV. PROCEDURAL RULES 
It is perceptible, that either in Europe or Africa, the majority of the relevant countries, 
which apply the absolute majority system, while other jurisdictions operate with two-
thirds majority. In West-Europe, French, Spanish and Portugiese organic laws are 
subject to an absolute majority requirement.92 In Romania, for the French sample, the 
absolute majority of both chambers are required instead of the two-thirds majority of 
the deputies present.93 A further legal difference shall be also taken into consideration: 
any governmental decree could intervene in the organic domain only on the basis of 
parliamentary authorization. The urgent decrees might be approved by the Parliament 
                                                 
86     FOMBAD 2017, 50-65. 
87     art. 71. of the previous Constitution of Ivory Coast [2000] 
88     art. 102. of the Constitution of Ivory Coast [08.11.2016] 
89   art. 97. of the Constitution of Burkina Faso [02.06.1991]; art. 71. of the previous Constitution of Ivory Coast 
[2000] 
90     art. 15. and 29. of the Constitution of Morocco [01.07.2011] 
91     art. 65. of the Constitution of Tunisia [26.01.2014] 
92  art. 146. of the Constitution of France [04.10.1958], art. 81. (1) of the Constitution of Spain [07.01.1978], art. 
169. (2) of the Constitution of Portugal [02.04.1969] 
93     art. 76. (1) of the Constitution of Romania [08.12.1991] 
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a posteriory, these legal instruments could not interfere in the organic domain.94 
Concerning the level of required majority, similar logic is applied in Moldova, however, 
the Moldovan Parliament is an unicameral legislative body. Apart from this, the 
parliamentary stage of the organic legislative process is subject to stricter rules, than 
the ordinary legislation.95 The Hungarian Parliament is also unicameral, but „small 
two-thirds consent” is prescribed for the adoption and the amendment of these laws.96 
In Africa, the absolute majority system is dominant, it is often supplemented with 
mandatory a priory constitutional review,97 like in France, while in Gabon, qualified 
laws are adopted with ordinary majority, the sole additional requirement is the 
mandatory a priory constitutional review.98 However, some countries applies a 
heightened level of qualified majority. In Rwanda, three-fifths of the votes is needed 
for the enactment of an organic law,99 while in Burundi,100 in the Cape Werde 
Islands,101 in the Comoros,102 and in Guinea,103 two-thirds consent is necessary. In 
Ivory Coast, two-thirds requirement,104 was recently replaced with an absolute majority 
requirement, two-thirds consent remained in force only as a supplementary 
element105.  In Tunisia, after political or constitutional veto of the president of the 
republic, organic laws shall be adopted with three-fifths majority.106 
In the reality, the organic legislative process is not an unitary concept in most of the 
relevant constitutional systems. In France, certain financial organic laws have a quasi-
constitutional status,107 while organic laws concerning the organization of the Senate 
shall be adopted with identical terms by the two chambers. In Spain, the organic laws 
from the status of autonomous regions are subject to stricter legislative procedure, 
than other organic laws (mandatory a priory constitutional review is required).108 A 
similar tendency may be experienced in Moldova, where the autonomous status of 
Gagauzia is covered by an organic law, which shall be adopted or amended by three-
fifths parliamentary majority, instead of the mere absolute majority.109 The Hungarian 
                                                 
94     VIDA Ioan [2006]: Legistica formala. [Formal legislation].  Ed. Lumina Lex, Bucharest, p. 52-62 
95     art. 74. (1) of the Constitution of Moldova [29.07.1994] 
96     art. T. (4) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary [25.04.2011] 
97   art. 97. of the Constitution of Benin [02.12.1990]; art. 155. of the Constitution of Burkina Faso [02.06.1991]; art. 
197. and 228. of the Constitution of Burundi [28.02.2005]; art. 127. and 161. of the Constitution of Chad 
[1996]; art. 124. (3) and 160. of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo [18.02.2006]; art. 66. 
and 78. of the Constitution of Djibouti [1992]; art. 117. of the Constitution of Madagascar [14.10.2010]; art. 
132. of the Constitution of Morocco [01.07.2011] 
98     art. 61. and 85. of the Constitution of Gabon [1991, last amended in 2011] 
99     art. 73. (1) of the Constitution of Rwanda [30.05.1991] 
100    art. 75. and 86. of the Constitution of Burundi [28.02.2005] 
101    art. 173. (3) of the Constitution of Cape Werde Islands [1980] 
102    art. 26. of the Constitution of the Comoros [23.12.2001] 
103    art. 83. of the Constitution of Guinea [07.05.2010] 
104    art. 71. of the previous Constitution of Ivory Coast [2000] 
105    art. 102. of the Constitution of Ivory Coast [08.11.2016] 
106    art. 81. of the Constitution of Tunisia [26.01.2014] 
107   BRAIBANT Guy de M. [1996]: Normes de références du contrôle de constitutionnalité et respect de la hiérarchie 
en leur sein. [Reference norms for constitutional review, and the respect of hierarchy of norms] p. 323.; N° 98-
401, DC du 10 juin 1998. 
108   SOSA WAGNER Francisco [1979]: Aproximación al tema de las leyes orgánicas. [Introduction to the system of 
organic laws]. Revista española de derecho administrativo. No. 21, p. 199-204. 
109    art. 111. (7) of the Constitution of Moldova [29.07.1994] 
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concept also applies procedural distinction between qualified laws. The „small two-
thirds requirement” means the two-thirds vote of the deputies present, while the „large 
two-thirds majority” emphasizes the two-thirds consent of all parlamentarians.110 In the 
light of the abovementioned examples, procedural distinction are commonly accepted 
between qualified laws in the relevant European systems and especially the French 
distinction influenced also the African constitutional design. It is expressly provided in 
some countries, that the rules on public finances under a special procedure are 
covered by organic laws,111 while in other countries, the basic financial regulations are 
subject to a special procedure, which is close to the organic legislative process. It is 
also incorporated by some African constitutions, that organic laws related to the 
senate shall be adopted by identical terms by the two chambers.112 
 
V. THE SCOPE OF QUALIFIED LAW 
As it was stated earlier, the two main branches of qualified legislation are the 
institutional and the fundamental right aspect.113 The institutional aspect means, that 
in almost all relevant legal systems, the extra-constitutional rules on the functioning, 
on the organization, and on the relationship of basic state institutions shall be covered 
by qualified laws. As regard the fundamental right aspect, amongst the qualified 
subject matters, one may find fundamental rights, and institutions for the protection of 
fundamental rights. In my view, this ambiguity may be interpreted as the two levels of 
right protection by qualified laws. The direct level constitutes, that certain fundamental 
rights shall be covered by qualified law, while the indirect aspect provides, that the 
rules on the constitutional court, on the ombudsman, on the judicial system, and on 
the status of judges shall be adopted by qualified majority, as a safeguard of 
independence.  
In France, most of the organic laws cover institutional fields: inter alia, the functioning 
of the Parliament,114 the status of the members of the judiciary115, the status of the 
Constitutional Council,116 the functioning of the Economic, Social and Environmental 
Council,117 the powers and actions of the Defender of Rights.118 Moreover, the 
limitation of sovereignty of France also falls under the scope of organic law. The most 
conspicuous phenomena here is the almost exclusive dominance of the institutional 
aspect. Since fundamental rights were not included in the original framework of the 
                                                 
110    art. E. (4) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary [25.04.2011] 
111   art. 112. of the Constitution of Benin [02.12.1990]; art. 127. of the Constitution of the Republic of Congo [2001, 
last amended: 25.10.2015]; art. 88. (11) of the Constitution of Madagascar [14.10.2010]; art. 65. of the 
Constitution of Tunisia [26.01.2014] 
112  art. 67. (4) of the Constitution of Mauritania [12.07.1991]; art. 85. of the Constitution of Morocco [01.07.2011] 
113    1/1999. (II. 24.) ruling of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, ABH 1999, 25. 
114    art. 25. (1) of the Constitution of France [04.10.1958] 
115    art. 64. (3) of the Constitution of France [04.10.1958] 
116    art. 63. of the Constitution of France [04.10.1958] 
117    art. 71. of the Constitution of France [04.10.1958] 
118    art. 71-1 (3) of the Constitution of France [04.10.1958] 
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Constitution of the Fifth Republic, they are almost ineligible to fall within the scope of 
organic law. Since 1958, the scope of organic law was slightly extended by 
constitutional amendments, for instance, the defender of rights was referred to the 
qualified domain in 2008. 
The Spanish structure differs significantly from the French approach. A separate 
article determines the two main areas of organic law: the statutes of the autonomic 
communities, and the fundamental rights and freedoms.119 Apart from this, several 
articles of the Spanish Constitution prescribe organic law on further institutional 
matters: for instance, the organisation of military forces120, the succession of the 
throne121, the referendum122, or the organization of the judiciary123, and the functioning 
and organisation of the Constitutional Tribunal124. Accordingly, the scope of Spanish 
Organic Law covers two main fields: fundamental rights, and the most important 
institutional aspects, as the Spanish Constitutional Court have identified. The 
institutional framework is based on the statutes of autonomous communities, however, 
other fields are also crucial. 
The Hungarian, Romanian and Moldovan constitutional system operate with qualified 
laws only in a very narrow circle as tool for the direct protection of fundamental rights. 
Two examples may be mentioned here: the freedom on religion,125 and the 
citizenship.126 
The qualified majority requirement concerns not only, and not primarily the 
fundamental rights, but also such institutions, which guarantee the prevalence of 
human rights. In the Hungarian, Romanian and Moldovan Constitutions, three such 
institutions are included within the qualified legislative domain: the constitutional court, 
the ombudsman,127 and the judicial system. In the reality, qualified laws play a more 
complex rule as an indirect safeguard for the protection of fundamental rights: for 
instance, in Romania and Moldova, the system of public education also considered as 
a field of qualified legislation.128 
The African approach of organic law by general terms is mostly French-influenced, but 
independent concept. Moreover, obviously, diverse solutions exist in the relevant 
African constitutional systems, however some characteristics are more or less 
general. The scope of African organic laws is considerably narrower (except from 
                                                 
119    art. 81-1 of the Constitution of Spain [07.01.1978] 
120    art. 8. of the Constitution of Spain [07.01.1978] 
121    art. 57. (5) of the Constitution of Spain [07.01.1978] 
122    art. 93. of the Constitution of Spain [07.01.1978] 
123    art. 122. (1) of the Constitution of Spain [07.01.1978] 
124    art. 65. of the Constitution of Spain [07.01.1978] 
125  art. XIX. (3) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary [25.04.2011], art. 73. (3) point S. of the Constitution of 
Romania [08.12.1991], art. 72. (3) point K) of the Constitution of Moldova [29.07.1994] 
126  art. G) (4) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary [25.04.2011], art. 5. (1) of the Constitution of Romania 
[08.12.1991], art. 17. (1) of the Constitution of Moldova [29.07.1994] 
127   art. 90. of the Constitution of Djibouti [1992] 
128  art. 73. (3) point N) of the Constitution of Romania [08.12.1991], art. 72. (3) point K) of the Constitution of 
Moldova [29.07.1994] 
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Burundi), than their French counterparts, but a common point is, that either the French 
and the numerous African frameworks focus on the institutional aspect. Nevertheless, 
the African interpretation defines the institutional approach with narrower terms, than 
the French constitution. African organic laws concentrate on the legislative129 and the 
judicial130 branch, most constitutions prescribe qualified majority for the functioning 
and the organization of the parliament, and for the functioning, composition and 
competences of the highest judicial bodies (constitutional court, supreme council of 
magistrature, supreme court, court of audits, court of cassation, etc.). In addition to 
this, some further key institutions are often covered by organic law, such as the 
electoral committee,131 the social and economic council,132 the ombudsman,133 the 
media authority,134 local councils,135 and as the expression of popular sovereignity and 
direct democracy: elections136 and referenda137. One may argue, that on the basis of 
the French approach, fundamental rights are not protected directly by African organic 
laws. However, either in France, and in Africa, a great number of those institutions are 
concerned by organic laws, which are responsible for the protection of fundamental 
rights, such as the judiciary, the constitutional court, or the ombudsman. However, it 
would be a distortive and overgeneralized statement, that African organic laws do not 
protect fundamental rights directly, since in the Maghreb region, fundamental rights 
are expressly subject to qualified majority requirement. In Morocco, some fundamental 
rights of the citizens, as right to petition ,138 or right to strike139 are covered by organic 
laws. Furthermore, in Tunisia, a general clause of the 2014. Constitution refers the 
rights and duties of the citizens to the organic domain.140 This solution correlates with 
the so-called laws with constitutional force in Hungary during 1989-1990, however the 
two concept shall be distinguished clearly. In Hungary, laws with constitutional force 
                                                 
129  For instance: art. 103, 108, 112 and 115. of the Constitution of Algeria [28.11.1996]; art. 86. of the Constitution 
of Burkina Faso [02.06.1991]; Art. 148. 153. and 156. of the Constitution of Burundi  [28.02.2005]; art. 37. and 
62. of the Constitution of Gabon [1991, last amended in 2011]; art. 79 of the Constitution of Madagascar 
[14.10.2010] 
130  For instance: art. 123. cl. 5, art. 153, 157 and 158. of the Constitution of Algeria [28.11.1996]; art. 236. of the 
Constitution of Burundi [28.02.2005]; art. 77, 85, 89, 92, 93, and 99. of the Constitution of Central African 
Republic [27.12.2004]; art. 28. and 29. of the Constitution of Comoros [23.12.2001]; art. 90. (2), 96. (2), 100. 
(2) and 104. of the Constitution of Equatorial Guinea [1991, last amended in 2011]; art. 63. of the Constitution 
of Guinea [07.05.2010]; art. 125, 136, and 141. of the Constitution of Niger [31.10.2010]; art. 60. of the 
Constitution of Senegal [07.01.2001] 
131    art. 211. of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo [18.02.2006] 
132  art. 140. of the Constitution of Benin [02.12.1990]; art. 141. of the Constitution of Burkina Faso [02.06.1991]; 
art. 160. of the Constitution of Burkina Faso [02.06.1991]; art. 111. of the Constitution of Gabon [1991, last 
amended in 2011]; art. 97. of the Constitution of Mauritania [12.07.1991] 
133  art. 169. of the Constitution of Ivory Coast [08.11.2016]; art. 154. of the Constitution of Togo [14.10.1992] 
134  art. 24. and 143. of the Constitution of Benin [02.12.1990]; art. 212. of the Constitution of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo [18.02.2006]; art. 102. of the Constitution of Gabon [1991, last amended in 2011]; art. 126. 
of the Constitution of Guinea [07.05.2010], art. 163. of the Constitution of Niger [31.10.2010]; art. 154. of the 
Constitution of Togo [14.10.1992] 
135  art. 102. of the Constitution of the Central African Republic [27.12.2004]; art. 87. of the Constitution of Djibouti 
[1992]; art. 140. of the Constitution of Guinea [07.05.2010]; art. 88. (4) of the Constitution of Madagascar 
[14.10.2010]; art. 146. of the Constitution of Morocco [01.07.2011]; art. 65. of the Constitution of Tunisia 
[26.01.2014] 
136  art. 79. and art. 88. (3) and (10) of the Constitution of Madagascar [14.10.2010]; art. 48. (1) of the Constitution 
of Mauritania [12.07.1991]; art. 35. of the Constitution of Senegal [07.01.2001] 
137  art. 164. g) of the Constitution of Angola [21.01.2010]; art. 187. (1) c. of the Constitution of Cape Werde Islands 
[1980]; art. 176. of the Constitution of the Republic of Congo [2001, last amended: 25.10.2015] 
138    art. 15. of the Constitution of Morocco [01.07.2011] 
139    art. 29. of the Constitution of Morocco [01.07.2011] 
140    art. 65. of the Constitution of Tunisia [26.01.2014] 
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were adopted by two-thirds of all deputies, consequently, it was almost impossible to 
enact or to modify a qualified law. By contrast, in Tunisia, qualified laws on 
fundamental rights shall be passed with absolute majority, therefore, the system is 
more flexible and adaptable. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study has provided a brief comparison between the European and the African 
organic laws, and as the outcome of this analysis, certain points may be highlighted to 
demonstrate the relevant similarities and differences between the two continents. 
Firstly, it shall be noted, that most organic laws of the world are adopted in Africa, 
where more, than twenty constitutions contain this legal concept. The most 
influentious models are provided by European countries, however, organic laws are 
more popular in Africa, than in any other continent of the earth. Secondly, organic laws 
fail to fulfil their inherent function in Africa to promote the stability of the constitutional 
frameworks. The prolongement of the constitution is sometimes provided expressly as 
the function of organic law,141 nevertheless, in the reality, the basic consideration 
behind this legal instrument is always to extend the endurance of the existing 
constitutional framework. The great number of constitutional amendments and reforms 
demonstrates that this target has not been achieved in several African states. Organic 
laws are deemed to be more succesful in Europe, where except from Hungary, 
qualified laws are elaborated for the long-term. A further consideration is the greater 
weight of the absolute majority requirement, than the two-thirds system. Although the 
fact, that legislation with two-thirds majority exists in both continents, this solution 
remains exceptional, since it distorts remarkably the fundamental logic of 
parliamentarism. Instead of this heightened level of consent requirement, most of the 
organic laws shall be adopted by absolute majority. Apart from this, it shall be also 
highlighted, that the scope of African organic laws is generally narrower, than the 
European ones. The Constitution of Algeria,142 Angola,143 and the Cape Werde 
Islands144 Madagascar145 and Tunisia146 provide an enumeration, whichlegislative 
matters shall be covered by organic laws, while other African constitutions provides in 
several articles, whether certain fields of legislation are classified as „organic”. It is 
also worth-contemplating, that in Europe, a clear distinction shall be made between 
the institutional and the fundamental right protection aspect of qualified law, in Spain, 
and earlier in Hungary, several fundamental rights were considered as qualified 
subject matters. Due to the strong influence of the French constitutional development, 
and the character of the African democratic transitions, the fundamental right aspect 
has been almost neglected in Africa, except from some Maghreb countries. Organic 
                                                 
141    art. 127. of the Constitution of Chad [1996] 
142    art. 123. of the Constitution of Algeria [28.11.1996] 
143    art. 160. and 164. c), g), h) and i) of the Constitution of Angola [21.01.2010] 
144    art. 187. (1) of the Constitution of Cape Werde [1980] 
145    art. 88. of the Constitution of Madagascar [14.10.2010] 
146    art. 65. of the Constitution of Tunisia [26.01.2014 
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laws are considered primarily as an institutional instrument, which protect fundamental 
rights only indirectly, through providing stability for certain organs of the state. Lastly, 
the dogmatic background of organic laws has been conceptualized in depth in certain 
European countries, especially in France, and less detailedly in Spain, and Hungary. 
In other European countries and in Africa, the theoretic principles for or against 
qualified laws have not been researched, this legal instrument is often evaluated as a 
tool for stabilization. Similarly, in the practice of some constitutional courts, the 
character of qualified law is dubious as a legal source. On the contrary, the 
constitutional practice of several countries allocate qualified laws somewhere between 
the constitution, and the ordinary legislation. As for conclusion, a broad picture was 
provided from the different directions of the development of European and African 
organic laws, which enrich our experience from qualified law. All in all, in most cases, 
qualified law do not fulfil their original function as a factor of stabilization (especially 
when two-thirds majority is applied), therefore, their justification is at least dubious. 
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